Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of language developed in the Tractatus held that one fact can picture another, and that a proposition is a picture of a state of affairs. But what makes a fact into a picture of a given state of affairs? According to Wittgenstein it is the correlations between the picture elements and the objects of the pictured situation, and the correlations between relations among picture elements and relations among objects. A standard objection was that pictures, unlike propositions, do not assert anything and that therefore propositions cannot be pictures. On a common interpretation of the Picture Theory (held, e.g., by Anscombe) the reply is that the above-mentioned correlations not only make the mere fact into a picture of something, but also make it into an articulate proposition. But, as this paper argues, this neither handles the objection, nor is it Wittgenstein's view. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's own account faces serious difficulties in addressing these issues, and the Anscombe-type interpretation of the Picture Theory obscures this fact.